| Description |
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In this course we first discuss the general equilibrium model, the welfare properties of equilibria and their relationship with the core. We next away from the notion of market as externally given, and consider questions relate to the design of markets. First, we will discuss auction and mechanism design. Second, we consider the design of matching markets. Finally, we will discuss information design. The aim of this course is to give an overview of advanced topics in microeconomics.
Readings:
- Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny: Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd Edition, Pearson 2011
Further readings:
- Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor: Two-sided matching :A study in game-theoretic modelling and analysis, Cambridge University Press 1990
- Andreu Mas-Collel, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green: Microeconomic theory, OUP 1995
Credits: 3 SWS, 4.5 ECTS
Prerequisites: Mikroökonomie I
Evaluation: written exam
Lecture: Tuesdays, 14.15 - 17.00 h,
Exercises with assistant: Martial Zurbriggen (martial.zurbriggen@unibe.ch)
Exams:
1st exam: Tuesday, December 15, 2026, 14.15 -15.45 h, tba
2nd exam: Tuesday, February 16, 2026, 14.15 - 15.45h, tba |
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